Mr. Achille Mbembe, who is a historian, has made strange statements about an alleged “Bamiphobia,” which he claims is proven by the disqualification of Mr. Kamto by the Electoral Council and the Constitutional Council.
Suddenly, this ideological plague has gone viral on social media, fueling a surreal literature and angry accusations against supposed perpetrators—of which, of course, I am one.
I would like to tell Mr. Mbembe that social facts are measured by universal indicators. If the Bamiléké claim to be discriminated against in Cameroon, their case must be supported by precise indicators, because these are what reveal the intensity of the phenomenon, its mechanisms, and possible solutions.
The discrimination of a community is measured by the gap between its demographic weight and its representation in collective spaces. For example, when a community represents 20% of the population but only holds 5% of public jobs, there is clearly a disparity that justifies a grievance.
It is on this principle that, in order to establish the injustice of apartheid, one could say: “Black people, who make up 90% of the population, control only 20% of the economy.”
Or, to qualify the United States as discriminatory, one might say: “Black people, who represent only 15% of the U.S. population, make up 40% of the prison population.”
Here, one clearly sees a significant difference between the demographic weight of a community and its share in a given domain.
Indicators are legal tools recognized worldwide, and they provide a basis for a discriminated community to bring a complaint before the United Nations.
One cannot accuse an institutional system of discrimination without presenting at least such indicators.
From this perspective, the Bamiléké are very far from being victims of any discrimination in Cameroon.
Let us look at the facts. This community represents about 15% of Cameroon’s population, yet it is represented far beyond that 15% in virtually every collective domain.
The State of Cameroon provides four main collective benefits:
- Public employment, subject to regional balance: the Bamiléké receive their share in ordinary professions, and they are largely overrepresented in scientific fields, particularly in higher education.
- Positions of power, obtained through appointments and elections: the Bamiléké hold far more than their 15%.
- Collective infrastructure: no one can deny that access indicators for roads, electricity, education, and healthcare are better in the West than anywhere else in rural regions.
- Economic rents: such as public contracts, subsidies, and other support for the private sector. Because of their undeniable economic dynamism and their overwhelming presence in business, the Bamiléké benefit from these more than anyone else—and by far.
As for other advantages such as urban spaces or economic circuits, the Bamiléké are always overrepresented.
So one wonders where this strange ideology of “Bamiphobia” comes from, which we thought was merely a social media invention of Kamto’s blackmailers, until Mr. Mbembe came along to dignify it.
As for his arguments concerning Kamto, they do not hold up. Kamto is a poor politician who badly managed his career. Starting on false premises, he promoted a mistaken reading of power based on a so-called logic of “turns,” whereby after Ahidjo the Fulbe and Biya the Ekang, the next turn had to be Kamto the Bamiléké. This interpretation corresponds to no historical reality, since the presidency in Cameroon has never been organized on tribal rotation. When the colonizers imposed Ahidjo, they did not do so because he was Fulbe, and all Fulbe learned of it at the same time as the rest of Cameroonians. Likewise, when Ahidjo handed power to Biya, it was not a community matter at all.
And these are the only two Heads of State Cameroon has had since Independence. So where does this talk of tribal turns come from, to the point of accusing everyone of being hostile to the “Bamiléké turn”?
The logic of “if you don’t support me, you are Bamiphobic” is a manipulation that cannot work in a country like Cameroon.
Secondly, who can seriously claim that Kamto has run his MRC effectively? Between defections of top party officials, the maintenance of an aggressive and tribalized cyber-mob, election boycotts, threats to institutions, false debates, poor strategic choices, and ignorance of Cameroonian sociology—who can truly argue that Mr. Kamto has done what it takes to be a serious presidential candidate?
Was Mr. Mbembe expecting electoral institutions to break the law and grant Kamto a special pass simply because of his Bamiléké identity? Is he aware of the message such a breach of the law would send—first, to Kamto’s own supporters, who would take it as encouragement for their constant defiance of authority, and second, to other political actors, who would conclude that the State only yields to threats?
Cameroon is a highly heterogeneous and fractured country, and intellectuals of Mr. Mbembe’s stature should avoid complicating the situation further by spreading ideas that weaken an already fragile coexistence and erode trust between communities.
Dieudonné Essomba
